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RECENT CASES

I

CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS FOR FAILURE TO EXERCISE
REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND DUE CARE
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224
A.2d 634 (1966).
In Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America,' the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has defined the extent of liability of directors and officers for failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence required of them in the management of corporate affairs.
This decision represents a marked departure from the law as it had
been construed in a number of prior cases and imposes upon the
directors and officers of a business corporation a much higher
duty of care than that imposed upon directors of banks or build2
ing and loan corporations.
A basic principle of corporation law is that "the law will not
interfere with the internal affairs of a corporation so long as it is
managed by its directors pursuant to a free, honest exercise of judgment uninfluenced by personal, or by any considerations other than
the welfare of the corporation." 3 Under "the business judgment
rule," the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of a
director merely because the choice made by the director turned out
disastrously in light of subsequent events. The rule is tempered,
however, by a presupposition that the director or officer has in
fact exercised reasonable diligence and due care in making a business judgment. 4 Drawing the line between mere errors in judgment, for which no director should be liable, and judgment made
without the exercise of due care and reasonable diligence has
proved to be a most difficult task.
In describing the duty of care owed by directors in managing
corporate affairs, the courts have generally adopted one of two
rules. The majority of courts have adopted the "reasonable director
rule"-that care which a reasonably prudent director of a similar
corporation would have used under the circumstances. 5 Other
jurisdictions, including the legislature of Pennsylvania, have decreed that a director shall discharge his duties with "that diligence,
1. 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1411 (1967), requires of bank directors
such care as "ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like position." The Building and Loan Code, PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 15, § 1 et seq. (1958), contains no provision concerning the relationship
of officers and directors to such association.
3. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
4. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
5. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1890).
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care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in their personal business affairs"6-the
"personal affairs rule."
While the adoption of either of the above two rules implies
that due care is the standard of liability, the courts of Pennsylvania very early negated negligence as the test by refusing
to hold directors liable unless they were guilty of "fraud or gross
negligence as amounted to fraud. '7 The ruling case in point was
Spering's Appeal,' in which directors were classified as "gratuitous
mandatories" who were bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence
but no more. Strangely enough, while adopting the reasonable
director rule of ordinary skill and diligence the court concluded
that a director would be personally liable only for fraud or gross
negligence amounting to fraud. By way of dicta, the Spering
court added, "I do not mean to say by any means that their
responsibility is limited to these cases, and that there might not
exist such a case of negligence or acts clearly ultra vires, as would
make perfectly honest directors liable."9 The dicta proved to be
just that, for in Spering and the cases which followed, it became
apparent that fraud or its equivalent would alone bring liability to
a director and that conduct which was merely negligent, no matter
how ridiculous or absurd it would appear to the ordinarily prudent man, would occasion no liability so long as the director had
been honest and the conduct within the general scope of the powers and discretion confided to the directors.' 0
Such was the law in Pennsylvania prior to the adoption by
statute of the "personal affairs rule" of section 408 and perhaps for
a time thereafter. Two cases prior to Selheimer dealt specifically
with section 408 of the Business Corporation Law. In Otis v. Pennsylvania R.R.," a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania held that
while the extent to which section 408 changed the law in Pennsylvania was "uncertain," the test could hardly be different from
that applied prior thereto, that directors were liable only for fraud
or gross negligence amounting to fraud. This case was followed by
a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Smith v. BrownBorhek Co., 12 relied upon by defendants in Selheimer for the prop6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958) (emphasis added). See
also Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
7. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147
Pa. 140, 152, 23 A.2d 405, 415 (1892).
8. 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
9. Id. at 21.
10. See, e.g., Swentzel v.Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892);
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
11. 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
The court in Otis relied heavily upon the decision in Hunt v. Aufderheide,
330 Pa. 362, 199 Atl. 345 (1938), in which the court was applying section
408 standards but specifically noted that section 408 would govern the
relationship between director and corporation in the future.
12. 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
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osition that directors could not be held personally liable in the
absence of "fraud, self-dealing, personal profit or wanton misconduct."1
Whether Brown-Borhek stood for such a proposition
is neither clear nor of any importance since Selheimer answered
affirmatively the question of whether,
in the absence of fraud, self-dealing, or proof of personal
profit or wanton acts of omission or commission are the
directors of a business corporation, who have been imprudent, wasteful, careless and negligent, personally liable
where such actions have resulted in corporate losses resulting in the insolvency of the corporation.1"
Selheimer introduces for the first time liability based on conduct short of fraud or its equivalent. Although the court so felt,1"
it is extremely doubtful whether liability would have attached in
Selheimer under the common law "reasonable director rule" as that
rule was applied in Pennsylvania, since there was no proof of
fraud, self-dealing or wanton misconduct. Under the reasonable
director rule applied as a theory based on negligence and lack of
due care, liability would have resulted. It seems clear, however,
that the court in Selheimer has adopted the "personal affairs rule"
mandated by section 408 and has gone beyond the "reasonable director rule" applied previously. The standard is based on negligence; the very important question remaining to be answered is
the extent to which, if any, the "personal affairs rule" sets down a
more stringent duty of care than the "reasonable director rule."
One well-known authority states that the result should be the same
regardless of which expression is adopted to describe the standard
of care required. 16 One Pennsylvania court, however, has explained the difference in the two standards by remarking that "one
implies an oversight and knowledge of every detail of his business;
the other suggests such care only as a man can give in a short space
of time to the business of other persons, from whom he receives no
13. 423 Pa. at 573, 224 A.2d at 640. The actual holding in BrownBorhek as to the standard governing liability is not clear. No fraud, selfdealing or wilful misconduct as required by the prior cases for liability was
shown. The case was one of pure negligence and imprudence. The majority opinion by implication must have found liability since it based its
holding on stockholder ratification of the director's action. The concurring
opinion of Justice Roberts rests on the fact that no actionable misconduct
was found. Justice Cohen in dissenting would have found actionable misconduct without the prior requirements and would have disallowed ratification by a majority of stockholders. Justice Cohen wrote the opinion in
Selheimer and distinguished Brown-Borhek on the ground that that case
involved "passive negligence and ratification" while Selheimer involved affirmative acts of misconduct and no question of ratification was involved.
Query as to the extent to which the Brown-Borhek rule of stockholder
ratification will be permitted in the future and to what types of conduct
will it be applied?
14. 423 Pa. at 580-81, 224 A.2d at 644.
15. Ibid.
16. LATnN, Com'oRArioNs § 10 (1959).
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compensation.'
The difference in the tests would seem to lie in the amount of
diligence expected of a director in knowing the details and intricacies of his corporation's affairs rather than any difference in
the exercise of prudence and due care in taking corporate action. There would seem to be no difference between the taking
of a business risk by a director of a corporation or a man in his own
business. Directors are hired to do just that. The only difference
apparent is that a businessman usually has an "oversight and
knowledge" of even the finest details of his business. Directors, on
the other hand, especially in large corporations, do not and cannot
be expected to have such a thorough knowledge of their corporation. Does the adoption of the "personal affairs rule" put the corporate director in an impossible situation? If carried to an extreme,
it probably would. No standard should be applied which would
discourage honest, competent and qualified men from serving as
corporate directors.18 The language of the Selheimer opinion in
describing the test of liability would appear to give courts ample
flexibility to apply to each case a rule which would not impose
hardship upon directors, while at the same time providing for liability where the negligence or imprudence of the directors has resulted in loss to the corporation:
In determining the personal liability of the directors
in the case at bar we bear in mind certain well-established
principles: (a) the directors of a business corporation are
not insurers that their actions will result in a pecuniary
profit and that they are, in the course of their duties, called
upon to undertake certain calculated "business risks;" (b)
for errors in judgment, exercised in good faith, the directors
of a corporation should not be penalized; (c) what may be
negligence in one case may not be want of ordinary care in
another, and the question of negligence is therefore ultimately a question of fact; to be determined under all the
circumstances.19
A proper application of the "personal affairs rule" in light of
the above pronouncement would seem to require the exercise of
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in his
own business affairs under circumstances identical to that in which
the director was required to act. Although directors are not trustees in the strict sense of the word 2 0 they do stand in a fiduciary
17.
18.
pressing
19.

Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 150-51, 23 Atl. 405, 414 (1892).
See Smith v. Brown-Borhek, 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964), exsuch a fear if the standard applied be too harsh.
423 Pa. at 581, 224 A.2d at 644, citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.

132 (1890), for the final proposition.

20. 423 Pa. at 577, 224 A.2d at 642. The duty of a trustee is to act
with that diligence and care which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in his own affairs and if the trustee possesses greater skill than the

ordinary person he must exercise such skill as he has.
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relationship to the corporation and its stockholders 2 1 and as such
should be required to carry out their duties in a manner in which
they would manage their own affairs. Applying the "personal affairs rule" in this manner would seem to parallel a proper application of the reasonable director rule based on negligence or want of
due care. Could it seriously be contended that a "reasonable director" is one who would exercise no more diligence and care than
would be necessary to avoid "gross negligence amounting to fraud?"
The modern business world should and does expect more of a corporate director. In introducing liability based on negligence Selheimer has taken a needed step forward. A realistic application of
the standard announced, keeping in mind the complexities and uncertainties of corporate directorship, should not militate against directors who have honestly and diligently chosen to direct.
Compensation of directors and other corporate officers also
came under the court's scrutiny in Selheimer. The defendant-directors, without authorization at a director's meeting, paid themselves salaries out of the proceeds of the sale of stock. The court
striking down this action quoted the lower court in stating:
It is axiomatic that the directors and other managing
officials, as such, are entitled to no compensation for performing the ordinary duties of their office, unless there is
an express contract made in advance, or an express provi22
sion for compensation appears in the charter or by-laws.
At common law such action was illegal and void as payment
based on past consideration. This aspect of Selheimer should be
compared with Chambers v. Beaver Advance Corp.23 where the
court held that the action of the directors in voting themselves
bonuses for services rendered as officers during the preceding year,
not based on an express contract made in advance, charter provision or by-law, was voidable only and thus could be ratified by a
majority of stockholders. In doing so the court overruled a line of
decisions holding such action void. If in fact Selheimer is a reinstatement of the old authority it is clear that such action, being
illegal and void, could not be ratified by a majority of the shareholders. While the present state of the law seems unsettled, the
better rule would appear to be that adopted in Chambers: the action of directors in voting reasonable compensation for services of
officers and directors, not excessive, fraudulent or wholly out of
proportion to the services rendered, even though based on past
services and not founded upon an express contract made in advance,
charter provision or by-law, is voidable only and may be ratified
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958); 423 Pa. at 577, 224 A.2d
at 642.
22. 423 Pa. at 570, 224 A.2d at 639 n.7, citing Althouse v. Cobaugh
Colliery Company, 227 Pa. 580, 76 Atl. 316 (1910), and Grafner v. Pittsburgh N. I. & Co. St. Ry., 207 Pa. 217, 56 Atl. 426 (1903).
23. 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958).
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by a majority of shareholders. As cogently pointed out in Chambers:
There has been a tremendous change in the last 25
years in corporate powers, acts and activities, and the law
relating thereto. It has become a well recognized practice
in the United States for corporations, sometimes by resolution at the commencement of a calendar or fiscal year,
and sometimes by resolution near or after the expiration
of a calendar or fiscal year-when the corporation's financial condition is clearer-to approve the payment of bonuses
for that current or prior year to certain officers and/or
employees. Such resolutions of a Board of Directors, if
passed at the expiration of a year or shortly after the expiration of a year are voidable, not void. If the bonuses
are, as in the instant case, for the current or prior calendar
or fiscal year, and are fair and reasonable, and if they are
thereafter approved by a majority of the stockholders, the
courts will not declare them to be illegal .... 24
The final aspect of Selheimer bearing note involves the measure of damages applicable. The lower court had decreed reimbursement of the difference between the amount realized on public
sale of the Class A stock ($413,000) and the amount which the receiver realized from the sale of the corporation's remaining assets
($30,000) .2 5 In this manner the lower court attributed all of the
corporation's losses to the defendants' conduct. The supreme
court limited the duty of reimbursement to those losses which were
proximately caused by the negligent and wasteful conduct of defendants. 26 Furthermore, the court noted that in establishing the
losses to be reimbursed, it must be taken into account which defendants were serving as directors and officers at the time of the
particular acts of misconduct since defendants in Selheimer did
not all serve during the entire existence of the corporation. 21 Just
how difficult a burden this will place upon the plaintiff in such an
action remains to be seen. Certainly the directors should not be
held liable for actions which were perfectly proper when made although subsequent events show loss resulted therefrom. Many
cases will undoubtedly involve acts of misconduct resulting in damages susceptible of clear proof both as to causal connection and
extent of loss. When the negligent conduct of the director or directors produces a general business collapse of the corporation it
may be impossible to trace the failure to the particular director or
directors charged in the customary tort manner.2 8 In such cases a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
(D.N.Y.

Id. at 491-92, 140 A.2d at 817.
423 Pa. at 585-86, 224 A.2d at 646.
Id. at 586, 224 A.2d at 647.
Id. at 586, 224 A.2d at 647 n.28.
See discussion of the decision in Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614
1924), requiring that the loss to the corporation be traced to the

director's negligent act or omission, the problem involved and the possible
alternatives, in LATrIN, CORPORATIONS § 10 (1959).
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strict application of the rules of proximate cause and certainty of
damages may result in no liability despite a clear violation of duty
on the part of the directors. A possible alternative in such cases
might be to impose upon the directors the burden of going forward with evidence showing that no harm resulted from their
negligence. Where the negligence of directors has resulted in a
general business collapse, liability should not be frustrated by requiring the injured party to do the impossible. Likewise, an attempt to apportion liability among several directors whose negligent conduct has caused a general business collapse on the basis
that all charged were not directors during the whole period such
conduct took place may impose an unattainable burden on the injured party. Directors whose negligence has produced a single indivisible injury-corporate insolvency-should properly bear the
burden of going forward with evidence showing that their acts in
no way or only in part contributed to the corporation's loss.
RUDOLPH ZIEGER, JR.

INFORMED CONSENT TO SURGERY-SUBSTITUTION
OF PATIENT'S SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING
OF NATURE AND RISKS OF PROCEDURE
FOR OBJECTIVE REASONABLE MAN TEST?
Gray v. Grunnagle,423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
In Gray v. Grunnagle,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a new and totally different concept of the physician's
duty to inform his patient preparatory to surgery. The court by a
four-to-three decision (two justices concurring solely on the fact
that the issue of informed consent was properly submitted to the
jury) substituted the patient's subjective understanding of the
nature of his surgery for the classic objective reasonable man test.
By so doing, the court took a step backward into the morass of
subjective intent.
The action was brought in trespass; plaintiff alleged that Dr.
Grunnagle exceeded his consent 2 and that he failed to inform the
plaintiff of the collateral risks of the surgery. The jury returned
1. 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).

2. The consent form was a rather standard hospital variety. It was
broad in scope and clear in language, reading as follows:
Whereas, I, /s/ Charles B. Gray, residing at No...........
Street
------------------and now in the Allegheny General
Hospital of Pittsburgh, Pa.; and of full age, have been informed by

the physicians of said hospital that in their opinion an operation on
me is necessary for the proper treatment of my illness. I hereby
consent to the same and said physicians are hereby authorized to
employ whatever operative procedure they deem necessary, using
their best skill and judgment. Witness my hand and seal, at said
hospital, in the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, this 18th day of
January, A.D. 1960. Signed Charles B. Gray.
3. On January 4, 1960, plaintiff, complaining of. progressive paralysis
of his leg, saw Dr. Blakey, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Blakey told the
patient that from his initial examination a leison in the thoracic spinal cord
was possible. He suggested hospitalization and testing.. Dr. Blakey explained that an exploratory laminectomy was possible, and that this
procedure was a serious. operation. Mr. Gray was hospitalized on January 18, 1960 at which time he signed an operative permit (see supra footnote 2).. Dr. Blakey ordered a myelogram and also asked Dr. Grunnagle,
a neurosurgeon, to see the patient. Dr. Grunnagle examined the patient
on January 19, 1960 and felt that surgery was indicated. The. results of
the myelogram obtained on January 22, 1960 confirmed his opinion... Dr.
Grunnagle at this time told the patient about the procedure, its serious nature, and the possible risks. of paralysis. -Dr. Grunnagle, however, could
not remember the exact specifics of the conversation, or its exact date.
Dr. Grunnagle operated. on January 25, 1960.. He found a thoracic disc on
exploration and then performed a Kahn decompression maneuver. This
consists of cutting the dentate ligaments to take the counter pressure off
the cortico-spinal tracts of the posterior area of the spinal cord. It does
not involve any surgical procedure to the spinal cord itself. Following. 'the
surgery, the patient was paralyzed. Dr. Grunnagle testified that in his
opinion this was due to the continued presence of the disc.
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a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court granted judgment non
obstante verdicto. The supreme court reversed and reinstated the
jury verdict. On the question of liability, the trial judge had said
that the only issue for the jury was whether or not plaintiff had
consented to the operation or substantially the operation that was
performed on him.4 He charged the jury as follows:
Did the plaintiff consent to major or serious surgery, or did
he anticipate only minor surgery, and did he believe that
there was practically nothing to this operation, as he testified; and that's the only issue in the case. We know, of
course, that he did consent to an operation. The only question is did he consent to major surgery. 5
In its inception the doctrine of consent encompassed the situations in which a physician agreed with his patient to perform a
particular operation, and at surgery either performed a different
one or greatly exceeded the planned procedureA This type of
bodily invasion is analogous to common law concepts of assault and
battery. Thus, the action was brought in trespass.
The amorphous doctrine of "informed consent ' 7 began to
emerge in the decisions in 1960.8 The informing required by
courts is now directed to problems of collateral risks and hazards
of surgery. Consent is not "informed" if the patient is not advised
of the collateral risks of surgery. In this type of situation, the
patient has agreed to a surgical procedure and exactly that procedure is performed. There is a certain collateral risk, however,
inherent in the surgery and the patient is injured when that risk
comes to fruition. The duty to inform the patient of collateral
risks is generally considered to be within the province and sound
discretion of the physician.' The necessary corollary to this finding
is that expert medical testimony is a mandatory requirement if
the plaintiff is to recover. 10
The holding, and more important the rationale of Gray will
have monumental impact upon the medical profession in PennsylGray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 166, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (1966).
Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 169-70, 223 A.2d 663, 676 (1966).
Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. App. 1961); Corn v. French,
280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
Plant, Informed Consent-A New Area of Malpractice Liability?
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MICHIGAN SPECIALTY HANDBOOK No. 5. 29, 30-31 (1965).
8. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d
11 (Mo. 1960).
9. Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); DiFilippo v.
Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421
(Wyo. 1962); contra, Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960),
rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson,
334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
10. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Govin v.
Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
4.
5.
6.
71 Nev.
7.
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vania. Its first effect must necessarily be that of engendering
great uncertainty among the members of the profession. They
will ask after Gray-what is informed consent? The uncertainty
arises because the opinion does not make clear whether Dr. Grunnagle exceeded the written consent given, or whether he failed to
inform Mr. Gray of collateral risks, or whether he was liable on
both charges.
The court first discussed the problem of scope of consent. 1
The burden is always upon the plaintiff to prove that the operation performed, or substantially that operation was not authorized
2
In Gray, the consent given was for exploratory laminecby him.'
tomy. 13 The operation performed was an exploratory laminectomy.
After the surgeon ascertained the cause of the patient's increasing
paralysis, he performed a Kahn maneuver 14 in order to take the
pressure off the spinal cord. The only practice Dr. Grunnagle
was "guilty" of, was good medical practice. No physician would
or could be found to say that the surgical procedure performed was
not the one authorized by the patient. It would be the ultimate
in bad medical practice to perform exploratory surgery, ascertain
a readily correctible pathologic condition, and then sew the patient
up only to ask his permission later to correct the problem. As Dr.
Grunnagle testified, "exploratory" in its medical context means
that there is some suspected pathologic condition existing internally.
The physician opens the human body with an eye to finding the
condition and correcting it at that time if possible. It is clear that
the physician here did not exceed the scope of his consent.
The remainder of the majority opinion discusses the problem of
the lack of consent to collateral risk (paralysis). The plaintiff alleged that he was not informed that this was major or serious
surgery. The orthopedic surgeon who initially examined the patient testified that prior to hospital admission he told the patient
that from the basis of his physical examination he felt the patient
had a lesion in the spinal cord or the brain. He said that the proposed X-ray studies were of the inside of the spine. He told the
patient that the study showed a space-taking defect in the thoracic
spinal area. He said that the operation necessary was an exploratory laminectomy and that it was a serious operation. This conGray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 155, 223 A.2d 663, 668 (1966).
Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15 (1940).
13. BLAKISTON, NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1956). A laminectomy is a surgical removal of one or more neural laminas of the
vertebrae, often including the spinous processes of the vertebrae.
11.
12.

14.

KAHN, BASSETT, SCHNEIDER, & CROSBY,

CORRELATIVE NEUROSURGERY

338-39 (Chas. C. Thomas, pub. 1955). The dentate ligaments are sectioned,
thus removing the vice-like grip on the pyramidal tracts. Posterior displacement of a herniated disc causes paralysis by anterior cord compression
with secondary stress upon the cord just above the area of attachment of
these dentate ligaments. The areas of the lateral pyramidal tracts receive
the greatest stress.
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versation was a full six days prior to the surgery. The operating
neurosurgeon, Dr. Grunnagle, testified that he told the patient that
this was serious or major surgery, and that there was a collateral
risk of paralysis. Dr. Grunnagle, however, could not remember his
exact conversation with the patient. Unfortunately, his memory
was not adequate enough to enable him to remember one specific
conversation with one patient which had transpired some five years
and nine months before. Defendant, who had performed some
4,000 operations, testified that he made it standard practice to inform patients of the seriousness of the surgery when operating
on the brain or spinal cord. 15 It is submitted that the credible
evidence here was so much in the defendant's favor that there was
no jury question involved.
The majority apparently feels that the patient must understand
the nature of the treatment. 16 It is rather difficult to see how the
physicians here could have explained Mr. Gray's problem with
greater candor, detail, or simplicity. Does the court mean to imply that from now on the surgeon is under an obligation preoperatively to impart to his patient all the risks, ramifications,
indications, and contra-indications of the procedure? It is respectfully submitted that this level of understanding takes a minimum
of ten years of study to comprehend.' 7
The real problem, however, centers on the charge to the jury
in terms of the patient's belief and anticipation. It would seem
that regardless of the simplicity of explanation and the depth of
discussions, if Mr. Gray did not understand, his consent was uninformed. This concept of subjective intent overrules by implication
the reasonable man test stated in Dicenzo v. Berg."' Two very
important factors must be considered in analyzing the jury charge:
(1) the overwhelming disability shifted upon the defendant
when it is incumbent upon him to prove what lurks
in the confines of another's mind.
(2) the jury should not be instructed to consider only one
side of the testimony.
The jury here was charged with the burden of analyzing what the
patient believed and what the patient anticipated. They were not
charged with an analysis of what was said by Dr. Grunnagle and
Dr. Blakey and what conclusions a reasonably prudent man would
draw from these conversations.
.15. Dr. Grunnagle-in his testimony stated that in the Pittsburgh community it was considered standard medical practice to inform the patient
pre-operatively of the collateral risk of paralysis whenever a neurosurgeon
performed an operation on the spinal cord or brain.
16. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 166, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (1966).
17. The average length of time necessary for completion of a course of
study in the neurosurgical specialty is ten years. This may be divided
into four years of medical school, one year of internship and five years of
neurosurgical residency training.
18. 340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15 (1940).
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The court has rendered the medical profession an extreme disservice. By their decision in Gray, the court is now requiring the
physician to proceed at his own risk. No longer will an explanation
be judged in light of the reasonable man standard. Now the practitioner must be plagued with nagging doubts. Does this patient
believe from what I have disclosed to him that his surgery is
serious? A reasonable man would so believe, but does this patient
so understand. Indeed, a full and complete explanation of all
facets of a problem requisite for full understanding may on occasion be very bad medicine.1" If the physician's explanation is too
extensive there is a distinct possibility of alarming an already apprehensive patient. By so doing, the physician can convert a fair
surgical risk patient into a poor surgical risk. In addition, there is
always the distinct possibility that an unduly detailed explanation
of all possible risks and problems will so frighten the patient that
he refuses surgery and by so doing forfeits any chance of life.
When these grave consequences are considered, it would seem that
the courts should reject any requirement for a heavy-handed,
formalistic, text-book explanation and allow the physician to tailor
his discussions to meet each particular patient's needs. Specificity
and detail of explanation prior to surgery are strictly matters of
medical judgment best left to the individual practitioner. The
Kansas court in Williams v. Menehan20 appears to adopt the view
that too complete a disclosure may in itself be malpractice. The
court said: "To make a complete disclosure of all facts, diagnoses
and alternatives or possibilities which might occur to the doctor
patient that it would, in fact, constitute bad
could so alarm the
' 21
medical practice.

In addition to the fundamental problems of informed consent,
the court in Gray was silent on the issue of causation. It is always
the plaintiff's burden in a trespass action for assault and battery
to prove that the defendant's acts were the proximate cause of his
alleged injury.2 2 Where the alleged injury results from failure to
warn of collateral risk, the plaintiff must prove that he would not
have consented to the surgery had he known'of the risks.

23

Mr.

Gray had the burden of proving that the exploratory laminectomy
was the proximate cause of his paralysis. Yet. the opinion is devoid
of evidence proving proximate cause. The only evidence on causation was that adduced from Dr. Grunnagle, who stated that the
present cause of plaintiff's paralysis was the protrusion of the disc
19. Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); Kinney v. Lockwood, [1931]
Ont. Rep. 438 (1931), 4 D.L.R. 906.
20. .191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
21. Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 8, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (1963).
22. Moscicki v..Shor, 107 Pa. Super. 192,.163 At. 341 (1932).
23. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. -393 350 P.2d 1093 .(1960), rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354:P.2d 670 (1960); Woods 'v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,
377 P.2d 520 (1962).
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in the thoracic region of the plaintiff's spinal cord.2 4 To counter
this expert medical opinion, the plaintiff offered no testimony.
Dr. Grunnagle's pre-operative statement referring to the possibility of paralysis from the surgical procedure 25 can not be distorted into affirmative proof of causal connection. Dr. Grunnagle
said that there was a fifteen per cent to twenty per cent risk of
paralysis in surgery of this kind. It is important to note that the
risk of paralysis is fifteen to twenty per cent when one attempts
to surgically exise a protruding disc in the thoracic region. Dr.
Grunnagle did not excise the disc; his only procedure was an
exploratory laminectomy and Kahn decompression technique. This
procedure does not entail a fifteen per cent to twenty per cent
paralysis risk. In fact, the risk of paralysis subsequent to the type
of surgery actually performed is negligible. There was additional
evidence that Mr. Gray's neurologic pathology was of a progressive
nature. There was a deterioration of his condition in the two week
period between Dr. Blakey's office examination and Dr. Grunnagle's hospital examination. Hence on the issue of causation we
have:
1. no expert medical testimony that the surgery caused plaintiff's paralysis;
2. expert medical testimony that the cause of the paralysis
was due to the presence of the disc;
3. evidence of neurologic examination by competent physicians indicating that the spinal pathology was of a progressive nature and may well have continued quite apart from
any surgical injury. Yet on this state of the evidence, the
court found that plaintiff fulfilled his burden of proof on
causation.
* No evidence was introduced by plaintiff to the effect that he
would not have undergone the surgery had he known of the collateral risk of paralysis. This proof was likewise vital to plaintiff's
20
cause of action. The principle was stated in Natanson v. Kline:
If, of course, the appellant would have taken the cobalt
irradiation treatments even though Dr. Kline had warned
her that the treatments he undertook to administer involved
great risk of bodily injury or death, it could not be said
that the failure of Dr. Kline to so 27
inform the appellant was
the proximate cause of her injury.
The Gray decision creates a myriad of new problems in the
field of informed consent. Foremost among them is the question
24. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 150, 223 A.2d 663, 666 (1966).
25. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 163, 223 A.2d 663, 672 (1966).
26. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960). •
27. Natanson v. Kline,: 187. Kan. 186, 190-91, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (1960).
See also,- Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1965), modified,
2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1965).
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of the standard by which a physician's explanations and discussions are to be judged. Does the majority opinion intend to change
the prior reasonable man test and lead this jurisdiction into the
no-man's land of subjective intent? In an action in trespass for
assault and battery against a physician, has the court eliminated
plaintiff's need to show by independent expert medical testimony
that the defendant's act was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury? The concurring opinion by Justice Roberts in which he
was joined by Justice Cohen adds to the uncertainty created by
the majority opinion. The concurring opinion agreed only that the
issue of informed consent should have gone to the jury. Did they
concur with the language of the trial judge based on the patient's
subjective understanding of the nature of his surgery? Or did they
concur solely on the submitted question: "Did plaintiff authorize
the operation, or substantially the operation that was performed
on him?" The court, by reinstating the jury verdict has by implication given their carte blanche approval of the entire jury
charge.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should, at its earliest opportunity, reappraise the rationale of Gray, and clarify its position on
the nature of informed consent and the necessity of proximate
cause. The medical community would hope that the criteria
adopted by the majority will be expressly rejected. To quote from
Mr. Chief Justice Bell: "The practical effect of the majority opinion would require a surgeon to be not only (1) an able surgeon
but also (2) a prophet."28 He must now not only explain the proposed surgery and its collateral risks, but proceed at his peril never
knowing whether the patient fully understands. "To impose on a
surgeon such a burdensome test is very unrealistic, very unfair and
very unjustifiable."29
DENNIS M. MAHONEY, M.D.

28. Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 172, 223 A.2d 663, 677 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
29. Ibid.

ARREST. SEARCH AND SEIZURE-"REASONABLE
SUSPICION" AS A BASIS FOR "STOP AND FRISK"
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966).'
A Philadelphia police officer received a police report of a burglary and a description of the burglar. Five blocks from the
scene of the crime the officer saw Walter Hicks walking. He
matched the description. Hicks was stopped in the street for investigation and as an incident to the detention he was frisked and
a knife was found. Hicks was arrested and subsequently booked
for burglary. The knife was introduced as evidence over objection
at the trial. In addition Hicks was identified as being in the hallway near where wood chips (apparently linked to the knife) and a
loose molding on a door were found. He was tried and found guilty
before a judge without a jury.
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruling on the
legality of the officer's actions held that a detention for investigation based on reasonable suspicion, a standard less than probable
cause, was not an arrest. The court also held that an incidental
"frisk" for weapons for protection of the officer was not unconstitutional and that the evidence found was admissible against the
reasonable suspicion and not probable cause
defendant although
2
was the standard.
The court first considered the question of whether there was
an arrest and an incidental search. The inquiry was reduced to the
question of: "To what extent under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, if any, can a police officer stop,
detain and frisk a defendant short of arrest? '3 Relying on Ker v.
California4 for the proposition that the states are not precluded
from developing workable rules governing searches to meet the demands of effective law enforcement and citing authorities in several jurisdictions, 5 the court said: "We take it as well settled that
there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of
1. A case with similar facts dealing with New York's "stop and
frisk" statute, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a, is now pending argument in
the United States Supreme Court, Sibron v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1042 (1967)
(noting probable jurisdiction).
2. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 8, 223 A.2d 873, 877
(1966). Ruling on a second question not discussed herein, the court held
that the Commonwealth did not have to prove ownership of the burglarized
premises where the indictment named the tenants but not the owner.
3. Id. at 4, 223 A.2d at 885.
4. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
5. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Busby v. United States,
296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); State v.
Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966); People v. Rivera, 14
N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964).
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citizens under circumstances not justifying arrest, for the purpose
of limited inquiry in the course of police investigation. 6 The
Hicks court also expressly adopted the reasoning of State v. Terry,7
People v. Rivera," and People v. SimonY
The second inquiry was whether an officer can "frisk" the detained person to look for weapons for his own safety and if so
whether any contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of a crime
found can be used as evidence against the defendant. Referring to
a "frisk" as a "patting down of the outer clothing by the sense of
touch,"' 0 the court approved the procedure and the admission of
evidence found by expressly adopting the language of People v.
Rivera:"
And as the right to stop and inquire is to be justified
for a cause less conclusive than that which would sustain an
arrest, so the right to frisk may be justified as an incident
to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search. 12
The Hicks court did not squarely deal with the troublesome question of whether the "frisk" was a search within the fourth amendment notwithstanding whether the "stop" constituted a seizure of
the person under the fourth.
A right to detain on a reasonable suspicion was recognized at
common law 13 and several states have authorized such a procedure
either by statute14 or by judicial decision. 15 The procedure also
has been approved in some federal courts. 16
People v. Rivera,17 relied upon in Hicks, is the leading case
dealing with "stop and frisk." In that case the New York Court of
6. 209 Pa. Super. at 5, 223 A.2d at 875.
7. 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
8. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965).
9. 45 Cal.2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955).
10. 209 Pa. Super. at 6, 223 A.2d at 876.
11. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964).
12. 209 Pa. Super. at 6, 223 A.2d at 876, citing 14 N.Y.2d 441 at 447, 201
N.E.2d 32 at 35.
13. Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P. 1810),
but caveat, it should be recognized that the English courts did not have
the Fourth Amendment to consider in relation to search and seizure.
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902-03 (1958); HAWAII REV. LAWS ch.
41, § 98 (1961); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (1961); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 594, 2.594.3 (1960); R.I. GEN.LAWS tit. 12, ch. 7, § 12-7-1 (1956),
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a.
15. E.g., People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); People
v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 215 (1961); People v. Peters, 18
N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595 (1966); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214
N.E.2d 114 (1966); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932).
16. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); Wilson v. Porter,
361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965).
17. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964); see also People v. Peters,
18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595 (1966).
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Appeals by way of judicial decision approved on-the-street detention and frisk for protection of the officer and required only reasonable suspicion and not probable cause'18 Rivera and another
were acting suspiciously outside a tavern. They spotted detectives
watching them and left rapidly. The detectives stopped them for
investigation and frisked them, finding a pistol on Rivera for which
he was convicted of carrying. In approving the procedure the court
said: "The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest
and the ground upon which the police may make inquiry may be
less incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known
to have been committed."1 9 Concerning the "frisk," the Rivera
court approved of that procedure by reasoning that since a detention
is justifiable for a cause less than is required for an arrest, a frisk
may be justified upon grounds of safety and precaution which
might not authorize a full search. 20 In other cases New York has
authorized the admission of burglars tools 2 1 and narcotics

22

found

during a "stop and frisk."
The California Supreme Court speaking through Justice (now
Chief Justice) Traynor in People v. Simon 23 indicated an approval
of "stop and frisk." The court said in dictum that there is nothing
unreasonable in stopping a person for questioning and in some
cases running the hands over clothing for the protection of the
officer. One year later the same court held that police are justified
in stopping a car to investigate suspicious behavior and in taking
precautionary measures for their own safety by having suspects
24
raise their hands and get out of a car to be searched for weapons.
State v. Terry,25 an Ohio Court of Appeals decision relied upon
in Hicks, held that while authorizing a detention for questioning on
reasonable suspicion and a "frisk" for deadly weapons, the holding
was expressly limited to a "frisk" for weapons for the officers
safety.
The constitutional problem that eventually must be decided is
twofold. First, is an on-the-street detention a seizure of the person under the fourth amendment? Second, is a "frisk" a search
18. At the time of the decision New York had authorized "stop and
frisk" by statute, N.Y. CODE CIM.PROC., § 180-a, however the events in

Rivera took place before the statute was in effect so the procedure was in

effect adopted by decision also.
19. 14 N.Y.2d at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34 (1964).
20. Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35; see note 11 supra and the quote supported thereby.
21. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595 (1966).
22. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196 (1966), prob. juris.
noted, 87 S. Ct. 1042 (1967), now pending argument before United States
Supreme Court.
23. 45 Cal.2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); see note 8 supra where Simon
was relied upon in the instant case.
24. People v. Martin, 46 Cal.2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956).
25. 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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under the fourth and affected by the "exclusionary rule?"26
There are three possible positions that could be taken. First,
that the whole procedure, including the "frisk," is not in violation
of the fourth amendment. Second, that the whole procedure is in
violation of the fourth amendment without probable cause having
been shown. Third, that the detention is not a fourth amendment
seizure of the person, but that the "frisk" is a fourth amendment
search as to the admissibility of evidence found, but not so as to
prohibit the frisk itself for the protection of the officer.
It is suggested, in light of the relatively minor invasion of
privacy that occurs in on-the-street detention, that this is not a
fourth amendment seizure of the person in contrast with a more
formal arrest.2 7 This position is reinforced by the strong policy
dictates
which arise from the needs of crime prevention and investi28
gation.
The more troublesome question is whether the "frisk" for weapons constitutes a fourth amendment search. The argument justifying the procedure is that this is not a search in light of the degree
of invasion of privacy balanced against the dangers to the police.
This position, though, ignores the obvious negative effect that such
a procedure has on the federal "exclusionary rule" as applied to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio.29- A search for contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of the crime could easily be masked as a "stop and
frisk" and be based only on reasonable suspicion-not probable
cause.
Although illogical, it is suggested that the "frisk" might be
allowed for the officers' protection only and that the "exclusionary
rule" should be applied to anything found. The purpose of the
"rule," to stop unconstitutional searches, would be served at least
to the extent that it would stop invasions for the purpose of obtaining evidence.
Admittedly, invasions would occur during
searches for the officers safety; however, for policy reasons a limited "frisk" for weapons might well stand approved.
ROBERT

H.

LONG, JR.

26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. See Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966); see also
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964); People v. Martin, 46
Cal.2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956).
28. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 5, 223 A.2d 873, 876
(1966).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HARMLESS
CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
Chapman v. California,87 Sup.Ct. 824 (1967).

A new harmless error rule applicable to errors arising under
the federal constitution was set forth recently in Chapman v. California.' The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, stated that before
an error arising under the constitution could be held harmless, the
reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman alleged error in his
trial due to the prosecution's comment on his failure to testify.
When the case was tried, such comment was allowed by the California Constitution.2 Shortly after the trial and before Chapman's
case was heard on appeal, the Supreme Court in Griffin v. California3 invalidated the statute and the practice of commenting on
failure to testify as a violation of the fifth amendment right to refrain from self-incrimination. The California Court of Appeals 4
held that defendant had been deprived of his right under the federal constitution, but nevertheless affirmed the conviction on the
basis of California's harmless error statute. ' The statute provides
that there shall be no reversal unless "the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice."6

With Mr. Justice Black writing the majority opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the California holding. The Court stated:
"We cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative
laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights."7 In order to
protect these rights the Court placed upon the prosecution the
burden of proving that the error was harmless. The majority,
however, rejected Chapman's contention that all constitutional error is harmful. The Court reasoned that there may be some constitutional errors which are so unimportant as to be held harmless.
Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the Court had no constitutional basis under the fourteenth amendment for exercising
1.
2.
3.
4.

87 Sup.Ct. 824 (1967).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
63 Cal.2d 178, 404 P.2d 209 (1965).
5. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 .
6. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 . The constitution provides in full that:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter
of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire case, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
7.

87 Sup.Ct. at 826 (1967).

came the basis of the dissent.

This portion of the majority opinion be-
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such "supervisory power" over the state courts in the matter of
harmless error.' He also argued that even if the Court did have
such power, the proceedings in the trial court should be considered
in their entirety rather than looking only to the alleged constitutional error. Justice Harlan advocated that the Court, in testing the
validity of the action, should ask only if the state statute was consistent with the fundamental fairness required by the due process
clause. If the statute meets this test, the only other inquiry should
be whether its application in a particular case meets the same requirement of fairness.
At the present time, the laws of the states, as well as the federal code, contain statutory harmless error provisions. For a typical example, the federal code provides:
On the hearing of any appeal on writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantive rights of the parties. 10
This statute was passed originally in 1919 because the growth
of appeals based solely on technical errors was plaguing the federal
It was hoped that the new rule would eliminate some of
courts.'
the baseless appeals by allowing the court to decide if an error
was harmless in a particular case." ' The effect of the harmless
error rule was to put the burden on the defendant to show that
any technical error affected his substantive rights. 13 If substantive
rights were not affected, then the error was to be disregarded.
The courts have built up a considerable body of case law in
differentiating between substantial and harmless error.14 The characterization has been important, because the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to prove that the violation of substantive rights
8. 87 Sup.Ct. at 839.
9. See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85, 92 (1963).
10. 63 Stat. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C. 2111 (1959). Similar provisions are
found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 61, and Federal Criminal

Rules 52 (a).

11. For a background discussion of harmless error in England and
the United States and the history of the federal statute see Sunderland,
The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TExAs L. REV. 126, 146 (1927). See
also MOORE,FEDERAL PRACTICE § 61.01 (1966); 4 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 437.(195 1); Kotteakos. v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
12. In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the Court said
that the purpose of the rule is to substitute judgment for automatic application of rules, but at the same time to perform that function without giving
men fairly convicted a multiplicity of loopholes. Id. at 760.
13. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Lake v. United
States, 302 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1962); Baker v. United States, 156 F.2d 386
(5th Cir. 1946).
14. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458 (1899); Walker v. United States, 322 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir.
1963). For a comprehensive presentation of cases. of •harmless and substantial errors, see 4 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7571 (1951).
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did not produce the defendant's conviction. If the error is characterized as harmless, then the burden is on the defendant to prove
that the error was harmful. 15
Some cases prior to Chapman suggested that all constitutional
errors were substantial and thus ground for reversal. 10 Other
cases, however, held that some constitutional errors were not
substantial. 17 Chapman in dictum now states that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the reviewing court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."18 Under this ruling the burden is on the prosecution: all constitutional error is now substantial under the traditional definition of the term (burden of proof is on the prosecution). The Court, however, further states that some constitutional
error may be harmless.' 9 This would appear to be a potential
source of confusion, since the burden of proof in harmless error has
heretofore been placed on the defendant.
The dissent in Chapman pointed to another open issue when it
argued that the harmless error rules should be concerned with the
proceedings as a whole, and not individual errors. 20 The Chapman
majority opinion was devoted exclusively to consideration of the
error via comment on failure to testify. In Kotteakos v. United
States,2' the leading Supreme Court case on harmless error, the
Court said that the "purpose of harmless error statutes is to substitute judgment for automatic application of rules, and to preserve
review as a check upon arbitrary action.122 By looking only to one
particular error, the Court in Chapman does not seem to have
exercised its discretion by looking to the whole record to determine
the effect of this comment upon the outcome of the trial. In his
dissent in Fahy v. Connecticut,2'3 Justice Harlan noted that "er-

roneously admitted 'constitutional evidence' may often be more
15. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 297 (1939); Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th
Cir. 1944); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
16.

Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); Walker v.

United States, 322 F.2d 434, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).

In

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the court held that convic-

tions would not be reversed unless defendant met the burden of proof

"except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm." Id.
at 764.
17. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1899); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Walker v. United States, 322 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir.
1963). For a listing of cases holding constitutional errors harmless and not
harmless, see 4 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2571 et seq. (1951).
18. 87 Sup.Ct. at 828.
19. 87 Sup.Ct. at 827.
20. 87 Sup.Ct. at 841. See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 94 (1963).
21. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
22. Id. at 760.
23. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
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prejudicial than erroneously admitted 'unconstitutional' evidence."24
Further, he stated, whether error is harmless turns not on the
reason for inadmissibility, i.e., that it violates the constitution, but
on the effect of the evidence in the context of a particular case.
In other words, constitutional error should not have a privileged
position.
The majority in Chapman recognized that there are two kinds
of constitutional error. First, in refusing to accept Chapman's argument, the Court stated that there still may be harmless constitutional error. Secondly, the Court noted that there was the type
of constitutional error presented in Chapman-errorthat is presumed to be prejudicial unless the prosecution can sustain the burden of proving it harmless. In its dictum that in any case involving
constitutional error the burden of proof will be on the prosecution, the Court appears to have overlooked the traditional distinction which has placed the burden of proof on the defendant
in all cases of harmless error. Instead of issuing extensive dicta,
the Court could have decided the case by terming this a substantial
error.
A third class of constitutional error not wholly within either
of the two categories above was suggested by the concurring opinion in Chapman. This category includes those errors which are so
serious that the prosecution cannot possibly meet the burden of
proving the error harmless. 25 It is submitted that these categories
are sufficient to cover all types of error and that there is no need
for giving constitutional error a special position. As Justice Harlan
said in Fahy, the reason for the error is not what makes it harmful
in a particular case. Rather it is the cumulative effect of the entire
proceeding that makes an error harmful or harmless. Therefore,
state harmless error statutes, with their emphasis on the entire
proceeding, should be applied to all constitutional errors unless
the errors are so serious that they taint the entire proceeding.
GARY C.

HORNER

24. Id. at 94.
25. 87 Sup.Ct. at 837. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion lists the
instances in which error cannot possibly be harmless.

PATENT LAW-JOINT INVENTORS-WHAT
CONSTITUTES PRIOR ART?
In re Land and Rogers, 151 U.S.P.Q. 621, 368 F.2d 866
(C.C.P.A. 1966).
Appellants Land and Rogers filed a joint application for a
patent relating to color photography February 13, 1956. The Examiner rejected certain claims because they recited obvious subject
matter over the disclosures of a sole Land patent and over the
claims or disclosures of a sole Roger's patent taken in view of
patents issued to White, Yutzy, and another Rogers patent. The
references relied on by the Patent Office were:
Issue Date
Number Filing Date
Patentee
June 6, 1944
2,350,380
White
July 24, 1956
2,756,142 Jan. 22, 1953
Yutzy
Dec. 18, 1956
2,774,668 May 28, 1953
Rogers
Jan. 17, 1961
2,968,554 Aug. 9, 1954
Land (sole)
May 9, 1961
2,983,606 Mar. 9, 1954
Rogers (sole)
(parent application)
Land and Rogers
Feb. 13, 1956
(rejected application)
The rejection was based upon two theories. First, a section
1031 obviousness rejection was employed using the Rogers ('606)
and the Land ('554) patents as prior art references. Second, double
patenting was employed using the claims of Rogers ('606) patent
in view of other prior art.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the Examiner's
rejection and appeal was taken to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (hereinafter the C.C.P.A.). The C.C.P.A. in In re Land
and Rogers2 did not rule upon the double patenting rejection. A
double patenting rejection in a common assignee case (the Polaroid
Corporation was the common assignee of the sole Land patent,
the sole Rogers patent and the joint Land-Rogers Application) is
available when the reference application has a later filing date than
the rejected application. Because of the later filing date, the reference patent is not available as prior art; therefore, only the claims
of the reference patent and the rejected application may be com1. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952):
CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY; NON-OBVIOUS SUBJECT MATTER
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
2. 151 U.S.P.Q. 621, 368 F.2d 866 (1966).
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pared.3 In the instant case the Rogers ('606) patent had an earlier
filing date than the joint Land and Rogers application.
The C.C.P.A. reversed the section 103 obviousness rejection and
held that the determination of what is prior art was an evidentiary
matter and a question of fact. It is generally agreed that inventor
A and inventors A plus B are not the same inventive entity.4 This understanding has carried into the interpretation of
section 102(a) and (e) 5 where the words "by others" and "by another" respectively are employed. Thus, an invention by A has
been held an invention "by others" or "by another" relative to an
invention by A plus B.6 Furthermore, "earlier filed applications of
'another' describing the invention claimed in a later filed application" have been held to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (e) "and as
such are available for consideration in a 35 U.S.C. § 103 'obviousness'
rejection."' This is so even where the applications were copending.8
Therefore, an earlier filed application by A (Roger '606) could be
used as prior art to reject a later filed joint application of A plus
B (Land plus Rogers) as a matter of law under a section 103
obviousness rejection.
Rule 1319 is a procedural method which may be used to overcome such a rejection. If the applicant can show, through facts,
that the invention was reduced to practice before the reference
filing date, or was conceived and was diligently being reduced to
practice before the reference filing date, the reference is overcome
and cannot be used as a bar to the granting of a patent. This is the
common "swearing back" practice and is based on the fact that
section 102(e) prior art is determined from its filing date.
Therefore, the only way that inventors A plus B could overcome a prior art reference of A was to comply with the requirements of Rule 131 and "swear back" of the reference. The C.C.P.A.
has abdicated from the "matter of law" interpretation of what constitutes prior art and has made the determination of prior art a
question of fact exclusive of Rule 131 in the situation where an
3. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. 570, 359 F.2d 886 (1966).
4. In re Ward, 111 U.S.P.Q. 101, 236 F.2d 428 (1956).
5. 35 U.C. § 102 (1952):
CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY; NOVELTY AND LOSS
OF RIGHT TO PATENT
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or ....
6. In re Ward, 111 U.S.P.Q. 101, 236 F.2d 428 (1956).
7. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 572, 359 F.2d at 888 (1966).
8. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
9. Ru Es OF PRACTICE, United States Patent Office, 131.
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application by A plus B is being rejected by a reference patent of A.
The significant words in 102 (a) are 'known or used by
others . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant'
and the parallel words in 102 (e) are 'application for patent
by another . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant.' The real issue is whether all the evidence, including
the references, truly shows knowledge by another prior to
the time appellants made their invention or whether it
shows the contrary. It is a question of fact. 10
The C.C.P.A. noted that compliance with Rule 131 is not the
only way to remove a reference as a bar, though this was the only
accepted practice before the instant case. If the evidence submitted
shows that the disclosures of the reference patent or application
were known after the invention date of the rejected application,
this would also remove the bar. There is no particular required
order in which inventions must be filed. It is readily conceivable
that an application by A may disclose the invention of A plus B
even though A did not know of the invention by A plus B prior to
the invention date of A plus B. A may make his invention and not
file for a patent until after A plus B had made their invention.
It would not be uncommon for A to disclose the invention of A
plus B in his application if the subject matter was related. However,
A did not know of the A plus B invention before A plus B invented
it. Thus, he is not disclosing prior art as defined by section 102(e).
It would appear that any 102 (e) reference patent or application
may be removed as a bar if it can be shown that the disclosures in
the reference patent, disclosing the material contained in the rejected application, were not known prior to the invention date of
the rejected application. This is a logical extension of the rule in
the instant case and the C.C.P.A. suggests the scope of the rule:
When the 102 (e) reference patentee got knowledge of the
applicant's invention from him, as by being associated with
him. . . and thereafter describes it, he necessarily files the
application after the applicant's invention date and the patent as a 'reference' does not evidence that the invention,
when made, was already known to the others."
However, the disclosures of the sole Land and the sole Rogers
('606) patents which disclose these individual inventions and do
not disclose the information contained in the jointly filed application still constitute prior art. In this sense A is a separate legal
and inventive entity as to A plus B jointly. Therefore, the A plus
B application may still be rejected as obvious over the disclosures
of A's patent or application when the disclosures relied upon for
rejection relate to A's invention. These disclosures constitute prior
art since they were known "by another" prior to A plus B's invention date.
10.
11.

151 U.S.P.Q. at 632, 360 F.2d at 878 (1966).
151 U.S.P.Q. at 633, 360 F.2d at 879 (1966).
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Thus, the ultimate question becomes which disclosure was relied upon for the rejection and who invented that particular disclosure. If it can be shown that A plus B invented it, it clearly
cannot be prior art even if it is disclosed in an application by A
filed earlier than the rejected application. This question is exclusive of Rule 131 which requires affidavits to show reduction to
practice before the filing date of A. It is a different inquiry
than the Rule 131 inquiry, but the result is the same-the reference
patent or application will not act as a bar.
The rule of the instant case is not only a practical analysis of
what constitutes prior art, but it also benefits research and development personnel throughout the country. More and more the
"team effort" concept is becoming the common method of operation
for reasons of economy and more concentrated technology. So
interrelated is much of the inventive genius of the country that it
is difficult in many instances to determine the date of an invention.
Though records are kept, they are sometimes inadequate. With
this new holding the concern shifts to who invented and not when.
Though some may disagree, the burden has been lightened.
GARY

R. MYEmS
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